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The president and members of  Congress have been grappling with runaway 
budget deficits for over a decade. The 12-digit budget deficits of the 1980s 
have been blamed for everything from a decline in private investment and 
personal savings to trade imbalances with Japan. Collectively, the nation's 
policymakers seem akin to credit-card junkies, hooked on living beyond their 
means, borrowing to pay the interest on their debt. 
Federal budget deficits are of course not new. Every president in the post- 
war  period has run on a platform that included a promise to bring federal 
spending under control. Indeed, in only 10 of the last 60  years have federal 
revenues exceeded expenditures. Recently, however,  real  debt more  than 
doubled from 1981 to 1988. As  shown in figure 3.1, the swift growth in the 
debt as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP) in the 1980s reversed 
the general trend of the postwar period in which the ratio of debt to GNP had 
been declining.' The debt as a percentage of GNP in  1981 stood at slightly 
more than 32 percent. This jumped to 45  percent by  1985  and to over 50 
percent in 1987. 
Whole forests have been felled by analysts sawing through the causes and 
consequences of the runaway deficits of the 1980s. 'Ikro explanations for the 
Occurrence of these deficits have received widespread currency. First, though 
much pulp was pressed over the four-bit deficits of the late 1970% the plunge 
into the deficit abyss that followed Ronald Reagan's entry into the White 
House was a clear break from previous policies. 
While constant-dollar-valued revenues for fiscal years 1982-84  were less 
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Fig. 3.1  National debt as a percentage of  GNP, 1928-88 
than  the  revenues  collected  under  Jimmy  Carter’s  last  budget  in  1981, 
constant-dollar levels of spending increased more than 8 percent. Indeed, over 
Reagan’s first seven budgets, constant-dollar federal revenues increased by 
less than 21 percent, while constant-dollar spending increased by 25 percent. 
The discrepancy between spending and revenue in the 1980s led to constant- 
dollar federal deficits ranging from $50 billion to over $90 billion. 
This explanation focuses on the central role of the president in budget pol- 
icy.  Presidents, it is argued, through their powers of  persuasion, control of 
budgeting  information, and use of  the Office  of  Management and Budget 
(OMB) manipulate legislative outcomes, controlling the direction, if not al- 
ways the magnitude, of policy change (Neustadt 1954, 1980; Wayne 1978). 
Other analysts have seen the deficits of  the 1980s as a consequence of  a 
trend begun in the late 1970s. To  them the deficits of  the last decade arose 
from a change in the way Congress sets the budget. The Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act  of  1974 (hereafter, Budget Act) prescribed 
new controls on presidential impoundments and it is important to note, estab- 
lished a new  budget process in Congress. But the new  process, instead of 85  U.S. Budget Deficits 
balancing the budget, unleashed the spending profligacies of  Congress from 
the restraining hand of the appropriations  process. 
Spending decisions, these scholars said, had been disciplined by the House 
Appropriations Committee, whose members saw as their role guarding the 
Treasury from the expensive tastes of  their colleagues (Fenno 1966). The 
1974 Budget Act, by  reducing the role of  the Appropriations Committee in 
determining spending, ruined the incentives for members of that committee to 
police the spending of their colleagues: members of the House committee, it 
is argued, no longer seek to cut executive spending requests, but instead seek 
to secure their own slice of the federal largess (Schick 1980). 
These explanations represent two fairly common perceptions of American 
politics and the sources of  American economic policy. The first is premised 
on the widely held belief that the president, in the twentieth century, has come 
to dominate policy-making. The second is  based  on  a similar belief  that 
congressional committees, in this century, have  come to dominate policy- 
making. 
The purpose of this essay, by way of examining the deficit crisis, is to ex- 
amine these two views. I do so by questioning the basic tenets and inferences 
of each explanation. In so doing I also offer an alternative way to think about 
American politics, one that examines the relationships between the president 
and Congress and between Congress and its committees, within the institu- 
tional context of decision making. My central thesis is that congressional par- 
ties, to a greater extent than commonly thought, govern and determine public 
policy. I argue that divided partisan control of  Congress in  the  1980s, and 
divided control of government, led to rapidly increasing budget deficits, as 
the Democrat-controlled House and Republican-controlled Senate and presi- 
dency were unable to overcome the fiscal stalemate originally created in 198  1. 
3.1  Of Checks and Balances: The Thesis of Presidential Ascendency in 
American Politics 
For much of the twentieth century, Congress has been seen to be in decline 
relative to the president. The greater efficiency of the executive branch and the 
inability of members of Congress to overcome their diversity of interests led 
members of Congress to “abdicate” their responsibilities in many key policy 
areas (Sundquist 1981,28, 35-36). 
Without presuming to undertake a full development of  this thesis or my 
critique here, in the next few pages I reexamine the thesis of presidential dom- 
inance. My goal is to reexamine critically the thesis that the runaway deficits 
of the 1980s are the result of Reagan’s policies. 
3.1.1  Abdication or Delegation 
The framers of the Constitution did not imagine that the president could 
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the lore of American politics that the president has come to dominate national 
politics (Binkley 1962; Bryce 1924; Burns 1965; Laski 1940; Milton 1965; 
Neustadt 1980; Schlesinger 1973; Sundquist 198 1). There is much evidence 
to support this thesis. The executive branch submits roughly 200 proposals to 
Congress every year, including budget requests, and legislative proposals re- 
lating to fiscal management, executive reorganization, and general policy. 
Congress frequently accepts these proposals  without  amendment (Pfiffner 
1979; Peterson and Rom 1989) and, moreover, Congress almost never takes 
action on an issue until it has received a proposal from the president (Edwards 
1980). Presidents also nominate several thousand people for federal posts. 
Rarely are these nominations rejected, and most receive only perfunctory re- 
view. 
So how  did this alleged transformation of national politics come about? 
Most of this increase in authority in the twentieth century has been the result 
of congressional delegation (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, chap. 7,9).  Con- 
gress, for example, in the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act redelegated the 
authority to transmit budget estimates from the various departments to the 
Bureau of the Budget and the President.* 
The thesis of executive domination argues that in delegating, Congress ac- 
tually has abdicated its authority to make decisions. The distinction here be- 
tween delegation and abdication is more than ~emantic.~  Many have argued, 
given the facts summarized above, that Congress no longer affects decision 
making on issues, such as the budget, that it has delegated to the executive 
branch. 
But what can we actually infer from these stylized facts? They are entirely 
consistent with  an interpretation that Congress, in delegating, actually has 
retained all of its authority over policy-making. The argument is as follows: 
Congress delegates to the executive branch its authority to make public policy. 
Members of Congress then use direct and indirect means (such as appoint- 
ments,  oversight,  appropriations hearings,  amendments to  appropriations 
bills, etc.) to discipline those charged with carrying out this delegated author- 
ity (Kirst 1969; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Wein- 
gast 1987; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Weingast and Moran 1983). 
Members therefore shape executive decisions as they are being made, thus 
largely relieving themselves of the need for the type of post hoc intervention 
that is the object of so many studies. 
So how  can we tell if Congress, in delegating, has retained control over 
policy-making? Evidence can be found in the ways Congress structures its 
delegations. Wherever Congress delegates to the executive branch or the pres- 
ident, we see the same attention to the details of structure, for the same rea- 
sons. The Budget and Accounting Act of  1921, for example, contains many 
provisions to control the revision, compilation, and transmittal of agency bud- 
get requests by the president (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, chap. 7).4  These 
provisions have been amended and expanded many times in the intervening 
years (including the 1950 Budget and Accounting Procedures Act, the Gov- 87  U.S. Budget Deficits 
emment  Accounting  and  Procedures  Act  of  1956, the  1958 Budget  and 
Accounting Act,  the  1970 Legislative Reorganization Act,  among others; 
see  Kiewiet  and  McCubbins  1991,  chap.  7,  for  a  complete discussion). 
Those who have argued that Congress has abdicated its responsibilities over 
policy-making have not ignored these facts, but they have missed their signifi- 
cance. 
The question of whether delegation necessitates abdication can be asked in 
a somewhat different form. Others have admitted that Congress has the ability 
to exercise control; they ask instead whether its members lack the will to ex- 
ercise control (Fiorina 1981). 
At some times, of course, members of Congress do seem more willing to 
exercise control than at others. The efforts by Congress to restructure presi- 
dential discretion in the 1970s are prominent examples. Members of Congress 
take on the mantle of responsibility most often, however, when the president 
is from a different party than the one that controls Congress. Delegation is 
greatest, it  seems, only when the president and the majorities in Congress 
share the same party label. 
The abdication hypothesis, in its more subtle formulations, contends that 
the delegation of policy  initiation, as in the budget,  has tilted the balance 
between the branches toward the pre~ident.~  And, it was the establishment of 
legislative clearance at the Budget Bureau that has been heralded as the prin- 
cipal source of presidential dominance in this century (Sundquist 198  1). What 
must be remembered, however, is that “Congress created OMB. Congress can 
uncreate it-or  change it” (quote found in Brand 1985, 1815; see also Kiewiet 
and McCubbins 1991; Wilmerding 1943). Even with an explicit delegation of 
authority to the president, as in the Budget and Accounting Act of  1921, Con- 
gress  need  not  even  consider  the  president’s  proposal.  Refemng  to  his 
troubled budgets at a press conference on October 22, 1987, Reagan observed 
that “every year under the law I submitted a budget program early in the year, 
and as they’ve done every year I’ve been here, they’ve put it on the shelf and 
have refused to even consider it” (Congressional Quarterly Weekly  Report [24 
October 19871, 2626). “When the delegation is not a power to act but only 
responsibility to recommend,” Sundquist observed (1981, 12), “the executive 
budget, for instance-the  Congress explicitly retains not only its full author- 
ity but also its responsibility to act.” 
Presidents do, nonetheless, gain some influence over outcomes through the 
recommendations  they  make.  Because  their  electoral  fates  are  partially 
linked, the president and his party in Congress will often find it in their best 
interest to cooperate. How much influence the president holds in this process 
is open to debate, particularly when his party is in the minority in both houses 
of Congress. 
3.1.2 
In contrast to the powers delegated the president by Congress, the veto con- 
veys to the president a property right in the legislative process. The president’s 
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proposal may matter on some occasions and not on others, but the veto applies 
to all acts of Congress. 
Some people, in analyzing presidential vetoes, have inferred that it is inef- 
fective because it is rarely used. Again, as in the thesis of presidential domi- 
nance, this is a mistaken inference. Members of Congress logically anticipate 
the president’s reaction to their proposals. Their proposals, then, usually are 
designed to avoid a veto. 
The influence that the veto gives the president is, however, asymmetrical. 
The president can use the veto to restrain Congress, to some extent, when he 
prefers to spend less than its members prefer. But it provides the president 
with no means of extracting greater appropriations (Kiewiet and McCubbins 
1988). This asymmetry derives from inherent limitations in the veto power. 
The veto provides the president with only the power to reject; it does not 
provide him with the power to amend. 
On spending bills, the president’s position is even more precarious: on re- 
ceiving a bill from Congress, the president can either accept the appropria- 
tions contained therein or veto it and let Congress write a continuing resolu- 
tion.6 Because of the emergency nature of  continuing resolutions, they are 
virtually veto proof. Also, because continuing resolutions almost always con- 
tain less spending than is contained in the corresponding appropriations bill, 
the president is able to reduce spending (to the level contained in the continu- 
ing resolution) through the use or threat of  the veto, but he cannot get in- 
creased spending from a Congress that does not favor it. 
Again, the details of the situation did not escape Ronald Reagan’s under- 
standing: 
The President of the United States cannot spend a nickel. Only Congress 
can authorize the spending of money. And for six years now I have repeat- 
edly asked the Congress for less money and they have turned around and 
given more-given  more to spend, and done it in such a way  that I can’t 
veto it when they put it all together, instead of appropriations, in a continu- 
ing resolution-we  haven’t had  a deficit-or,  a budget since I’ve been 
here. No-the  Congress is the one that’s in command. . . . And every bud- 
get I’ve sent up there has been put on the shelf and I’ve been told that it’s 
dead on arrival. (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report  [24 November 
19871,2628) 
The limited and asymmetric influence conveyed to the president by the veto 
is illustrated by the budget debates in Reagan’s second term. For fiscal year 
1985, Reagan proposed a  13 percent real (inflation-adjusted) increase in de- 
fense spending for the following year. He coupled this with a proposal to slash 
Social Security and domestic spending and to eliminate cost of living adjust- 
ments (COLAS)  for federal pension payments (including Social Security). 
The political reality on Capitol Hill, however, did not favor a package of 
defense increases and domestic spending cuts. Reagan buckled to the pressure 
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On the other hand, he requested steep “cuts” in domestic spending totalling 
$34 billion in current dollars. 
The package of domestic spending cuts and defense increases was still un- 
acceptable to Democrats and liberal Republicans. In March 1985, the Senate 
Budget Committee voted to recommend an inflation-adjusted freeze on de- 
fense spending and a freeze on Social Security. 
Faced with a projected deficit exceeding $200 billion (current dollars) for 
1986 and trying to unite a fractured party, the Senate Republican leadership 
negotiated with Reagan a 3 percent real increase in  defense spending. The 
package also included deep “cuts” in domestic spending. Reagan declared that 
a  3  percent  real  increase was  the  “rock-bottom  level”  he  would  accept 
(Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report [27 April 19851, 771). 
But, Reagan was holding the wrong end of the veto stick. Despite Reagan’s 
veto threat, the Senate rejected the Republican leadership’s package. Ulti- 
mately, the Senate approved a budget resolution that only reduced, but did not 
eliminate, COLAS  and that provided no real increase in defense spending. 
On the other side of the Capitol, the House, voting along party lines, rec- 
ommended more spending for domestic programs and less for defense than 
the budget passed by the Senate. Reagan pronounced the House budget reso- 
lution as “unacceptable” (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report  [25 May 
19851, 971). In conference the House and Senate compromised on defense, 
but  accepted  much  of  the  domestic spending increases advocated by  the 
House. As expected, Reagan accepted the bills passed under this resolution. 
In the final analysis, presidents do make numerous proposals to Congress. 
Congress generally takes no independent action on an issue prior to the presi- 
dent’s request. This does not,  however, imply congressional abdication or 
presidential ascendency. If presidential proposals are to succeed, the president 
must anticipate the reaction of members of the House and Senate to his pro- 
posals and accommodate their demands and interests. Presidents know this, 
so they rarely submit proposals that are likely to fail. Those who ignore this 
lesson have their proposals ignored. 
3.1.3  The Reagan Revolution and the Determinants of Federal 
Spending Policy 
The budget for fiscal year 1982 was heralded (or decried) as a victory by a 
powerful president over an institutionally weakened Congress. But what sort 
of  victory was this for Reagan? The much-ballyhooed $36.6 billion budget 
“cuts” were measured not against the spending totals in the fiscal 1981 bud- 
get, but against Carter’s proposed budget for fiscal year  1982 (in which he 
requested a whopping  17 percent nominal increase in  spending relative to 
spending enacted for fiscal year 1981). 
A vast majority of the programs and agencies that suffered cuts in Reagan’s 
budget had previously suffered cuts by the Democrats and Jimmy Carter, and 
almost half  had their budgets cut by  Democratic Congresses when Gerald 90  Mathew D. McCubbins 
Ford was president. Real spending in the commerce, energy, housing and ur- 
ban development, interior, and labor departments, and in the Postal Service, 
had  declined through most  of  Carter’s administration. Spending on  public 
works, other than sewage treatment plants and other environmental programs, 
had been declining since the late  1960s. Further, defense, expanded under 
Reagan’s budget,  also grew in Carter’s last two budgets. Real spending on 
other federal programs,  such as those in the Department of  Education and 
Department of  Transportation (DOT),  declined in  1982, but then  climbed 
steadily to new highs over the remainder of Reagan’s first term. 
Thus, though the  1982 budget may have accelerated an existing spending 
reallocation, it was not a radical change. Where Reagan did try to depart from 
the budgetary consensus of the previous administration, he was rebuffed. Al- 
most all of the programs scheduled for termination by Reagan in fact survived 
his tenure in office. 
What responsibility, then, does Reagan bear for the runaway deficits of the 
1980s? Constant-dollar spending grew at a faster rate during Reagan’s admin- 
istration (25 percent from 1981 to 1988) than during the Eisenhower (16 per- 
cent growth), Nixon (13 percent), Ford (3 percent) and Carter (12 percent) 
administrations. Annual changes in real spending varied from a low of minus 
eight percent in 1954 to a high of  13 percent in 1967. Reagan averaged a 3.3 
percent annual increase (constant dollars) in spending. 
On the other hand, Reagan, in his first three budgets, requested decreases 
for most domestic programs,  whereas on average, most postwar presidents 
have requested nominal increases averaging close to 10 percent per year for 
domestic programs  .s  Expenditures for many domestic programs declined in 
the 1980s. Whereas nominal spending had grown, on average, between 8 and 
11 percent per year (for the programs and agencies I examined) for each pres- 
ident from Truman to Carter, spending growth under Reagan was held to less 
than 1 percent per year. Thus, there is some reason to believe that a new direc- 
tion in American politics was blazed by  Ronald Reagan in his first term in 
office. 
But, Reagan did not have to contend with large Democratic majorities in 
both chambers of Congress, as did Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford. Indeed, the 
Republicans owned a majority of seats in the Senate for the first time in over 
two decades during Reagan’s first six years in office. In the 1980s with the 
Republicans controlling the Senate and the Democrats controlling the House, 
spending was cut, on average, for only 30 percent of the items in my sample 
of 69 agencies (which includes 63 domestic and six defense agencies). When 
the Republicans controlled both houses of Congress (1947-48  and 1953-54), 
by  contrast, they cut over 42 percent of the items in my  sample. In fact, the 
Republican Congress of  1953-54  cut spending for almost two-thirds of  the 
programs in this sample, more than twice the rate of  cuts garnered by Reagan. 
The question becomes,  what was the net effect on spending of  Reagan’s 
occupancy of  the White House? Certainly, Reagan was no more successful, 91  U.S. Budget Deficits 
under the circumstances in Congress, then expected.I0  Reagan was actually 
less successful than any other postwar president at pushing his spending cuts 
through Congress. Truman succeeded in getting Congress to enact cuts for all 
of the relatively few items for which he requested a cut in spending. Eisen- 
hower succeeded 84 percent of the time. Reagan by  contrast succeeded less 
than 60 percent of the time. Also, his batting average at getting spending 
increases out of Congress was less than any recent president. More generally, 
Reagan’s success rate in influencing congressional votes for each of his eight 
years in office was less than that of Dwight Eisenhower in each corresponding 
year (Stanley and Niemi  1988, 220-21).  Indeed, Reagan’s success rate in 
1987-88  was less than Richard Nixon’s success rate even during the period of 
the Watergate scandal (Nixon won roughly 60 percent of  his key votes that 
year). Thus, by  this comparison Reagan was  a weaker president than his 
predecessors. 
3.1.4 
So what accounts for the budgets of the 1980s? In the first place, though 
there has been much talk of budget “cuts” in the 1980s, constant-dollar spend- 
ing nearly doubled from fiscal year 1981 to 1989. And, whereas gross national 
product (GNP), valued in  1972 dollars, grew less than 24 percent from 1981 
to  1988, real spending grew over 25 percent. As shown in  table 3.1, real 
spending at the Department of Agriculture grew by more than 50 percent from 
1981 to 1986; defense spending in constant 1972 dollars grew from $79 bil- 
lion in  Carter’s last budget to $117 billion by  1986. At the same time, the 
Department of Health and Human Services grew by 35 percent in real terms, 
while spending at the Justice Department, the State Department, DOT,  and 
the Treasury also grew quickly. 
Second, those agencies and programs chosen for spending reductions in the 
1980s were largely ones whose budgets declined throughout the latter part of 
the 1970s. The Great Society programs (especially housing programs) and the 
regulatory activities of the federal government started declining under Gerald 
Ford, and  their decline accelerated under Jimmy Carter. The reduction of 
these programs was therefore begun under a Democratic Congress and was 
accelerated when both branches were controlled by the Democrats. 
Real spending declined in Reagan’s first budget (relative to the budget for 
198  1) for eight departments and programs: Commerce, Education, Energy, 
EPA, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, the Post Office, and DOT. 
Of these eight declining spending categories, two (Energy and the Post Office) 
were continuing declines begun under Carter’s 1981 fiscal year budget. Carter 
had requested spending cuts for three others: Commerce, Housing and Urban 
Development and DOT. The remaining three departments and programs that 
declined in Reagan’s first budget-Education,  EPA,  and  Interior-consti- 
tuted new spending reductions and can rightfully be attributed to Reagan and 
the Republicans in the House and Senate. For each of these three departments, 
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8.5  1.4  92.1 
10.3  1.1  82.5 
10.3  1.2  74.2 
12.7  1.4  72.6 
12.7  1.6  72.6 
10.2  1.3  66.0 
11.5  1.3  66.8 
11.0  1.7  69.9  3.3 
9.5  2.7  75.1  4.4 
10.0  1.5  73.0  4.4 
15.4  1.6  72.4  6.4 
11.8  1.3  72.8  15.5 
12.4  1.4  79.4  5.2 
12.0  .8  93.3  4.2 
15.6  .8  102.8  4.6 
16.5  .9  106.5  4.8 
15.3  .9  115.2  4.9 
18.6  .9  117.2  5.0 
65.8  3.3  6.0  9.0 
70.1  8.8  5.7  9.0 
73.6  3.6  6.9  12.0 
78.3  3.9  9.0  8.6 
85.0  4.1  9.1  6.7 
92.7  3.8  7.9  20.0 
92.2  40.0  20.9  14.9 
96.1  20.2  13.9  5.7 
106.5  13.6  18.2  9.0 
110.8  25.0  14.8  8.7 
111.7  19.2  11.9  10.1 
115.5  18.1  14.9  9.5 
113.9  17.9  15.5  12.5 
122.6  10.3  14.8  8.6 
125.0  5.2  15.1  14.7 
132.6  5.6  21.5  11.3 
146.3  5.2  13.9  11.6 
153.9  6.7  13.6  10.8 
Note: Abbreviations: DoA  = Department of  Agriculture; DOC  = Department of Commerce; 
DoD  = Department of Defense; Energy  = Department of Energy; HHS  = Department of 
Health and Human Services; HEW  = Department of Health, Education and Welfare; HUD = 
Department of Housing and Urban Development; DoL = Department of Labor; DOT = Depart- 
ment of Transportation. 
however, real spending rose quickly in fiscal years 1983-86,  undoing much 
of the reallocation of 1982. 
The budget story of the 1980s, then, is not the fiscal contractions so often 
advertised by Congress and the president. But several questions remain unan- 
swered. Why should spending have grown during the administration of  a fis- 
cally conservative president supported by  a Republican Senate? Should not 
the deficit have receded during Reagan’s two terms? To answer these questions 
I must first discuss congressional politics and the effect of the budget process 
on spending decisions. 
3.2  Party Governance in Congress 
To  some analysts of American politics, the runaway deficits of the 1980s 
are not the unintended result of  the Reagan revolution, but rather a conse- 
quence of a change in congressional procedure. This perception is based on a 
well-accepted view that Congress is not so much a democratic institution as a 
“pluralistic leviathan” (for a model of congressional politics based on this 93  U.S. Budget Deficits 
view, see Stigler 1971 and Becker 1983). Central to this view is the thesis that 
congressional  politics is committee politics. 
The “interest group liberalism” that purportedly dominates congressional 
politics, if  true, has profound implications for budgeting. As  Shepsle and 
Weingast (1984, 355) argue, “Legislators invent programs, seek funding, and 
are especially attentive to policy areas that create or maintain jobs within their 
electoral  constituency. . . . Expenditure programs  are,  as a  consequence, 
biased away from least-cost methods of production.” As each subgovernment 
pursues its policies in the way Shepsle and Weingast describe, the end result 
could be that the government outspends its receipts. 
To  mitigate the effects of interest group liberalism, members of  Congress 
purportedly have relied on members of the House Appropriations Committee 
to make the hard choices between supporting their colleagues’ programs and 
the need to economize on spending (Fenno 1966). This system was supported 
by rules and procedures in Congress that separated authorization from appro- 
priations. And the system appeared to work reasonably well, producing small 
but manageable deficits through the 1950s and 1960s. 
This all changed with the Budget Act of  1974. By transfemng authority for 
establishing overall spending limits to  the budget committees, the  act  so 
weakened the House Appropriations Committee that it could no longer guard 
the Treasury. Instead, its members seemingly became claimants on the federal 
Treasury rather than its protector (Schick 1980). 
Two assumptions underlie this explanation of  the deficit crisis. First, that 
“power in Congress has rested in the committees or, increasingly, in the sub- 
committees,” and thus, as a consequence, “throughout most of  the postwar 
years, political parties in Congress have been weak, ineffectual organizations 
(Dodd and Oppenheimer 1977, 40). Second, that the House Appropriations 
Committee was once the “guardian of the federal Treasury” and now is only a 
subdued guardian. I examine these assumptions in turn, arguing that congres- 
sional parties and party leaders exercise more control and greater influence in 
congressional politics, and  in budgeting in  particular, than commonly has 
been perceived. I then seek to explain the budgetary decisions of the 1980s in 
light of this new understanding. 
3.2.1 
The common view of  weak parties and autonomous committees in Con- 
gress, in its logical form, is identical to the view of presidential dominance 
presented in section 3.1 above. The membership of each house has delegated 
to the committees in each house wide-ranging authority to write legislation, 
hold hearings, and oversee the executive branch. This delegation, as was the 
case in interpreting delegation to the executive, has been mistaken for abdi- 
cation. 
Two factors underpin the importance and autonomy of committees and sub- 
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committees, according to this view: committees have jurisdictional monopo- 
lies, and thus an ex ante veto over proposed legislation; and committees  honor 
each others’ jurisdictional autonomy through a system of deference and recip- 
rocation (Shepsle and Weingast 1984, 351, 353). 
This view of committee and subcommittee power has been developed to 
explain a set of  generalized observations on congressional behavior. It ex- 
plains, for example, why coalitions within Congress are seemingly universal 
and nonpartisan-the  reason is that all members face the same necessity, to 
bring home particularistic benefits, and the institutions are geared toward es- 
tablishing and enforcing vote trades across projects and benefits. It also fol- 
lows, for the same reason, that party discipline will be very lax-the  vote 
trades cross party lines. Committees also use their powers, particularly their 
ex post veto, to ensure that amendments rarely get offered to their bills, and, 
when they are offered, few, if any, are successful. 
These observations also are consistent with party control of  committees. 
Indeed, none of the things listed above discriminate between the two views.I’ 
However, we do observe obvious violations of this cozy view of subcommit- 
tee autonomy. For  example, multiple referrals, where legislation is sent to 
several subcommittees, are increasingly common in the House. 
Members of Congress design their institutions  to fit their purpose. Students 
of American politics have tended to focus on those aspects of congressional 
institutions that enable members to bring home private goods (projects or pro- 
grams for their own districts). Studies of congressional  behavior have focused 
largely on how members secure water projects, military bases, roads, and post 
offices for their districts, and the consequences of  these activities for their 
political survival. These studies, of course, assume that voters appreciate proj- 
ects in their district and that members can build reputations as good providers 
of federal pork. 
But, party affiliations are also an important ingredient in voters’ decisions: 
party labels signal information that is otherwise very expensive for voters to 
obtain about the policy positions of  candidates. As a result, politicians, in 
seeking office, also establish reputations as partisans. Thus, politicians adopt 
a mixture of  collective, that  is, partisan, and individual, that is,  district- 
oriented, activities in seeking reelection. 
It follows that members will seek to structure Congress in such a way as to 
facilitate both of these activities. Party organizations, their leadership, and the 
committees that serve them, provide the institutional means for pursuing the 
collective goals of party members. 
But these pursuits are not to the exclusion of individual district-oriented 
benefits. Thus, the majority-party leadership uses its agenda powers, in con- 
cert with the agenda powers assigned to committees, to secure the omnibus 
pork-barrel logroll so familiar to congressional  scholars. 
The congressional parties, of  course, delegate much of  the authority to 
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Democratic caucus has at times sat down as a whole and made policy for 
the Democratic majority.  In delegating, the congressional parties encounter 
the agency problems ubiquitous to human experience: for a variety of reasons, 
intentional or not, the person to whom authority is delegated may not carry 
out their authority in the best interests of those doing the delegating. So per- 
nicious are these problems that their existence has led many scholars to con- 
clude that the congressional parties have in fact abdicated their authority to 
the standing committees and subcommittees of Congress. 
The abdication conclusion, however, ignores the efforts on the part of the 
congressional parties to mitigate delegation problems. In essence,  like the 
separation of  powers designed into the structure of the federal government, 
party organizations-in  particular the party  leadership-and  the system of 
standing committees, form a separation of  powers, a system of  checks and 
balances. Party leaders use a hierarchical system of committees (capped by 
the “control committees,” i.e., Rules, Appropriations, and Ways  and Means 
in the House), control of committee appointments and procedural restrictions 
to steer policy outcomes in favor of  the collective interests of  the majority 
party (Rohde and Shepsle 1973; Shepsle 1988; Cox and McCubbins  1991; 
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins and Page 1987; McCubbins et al. 
1987, 1989). 
Some standing committees, of course, more closely involve the party label 
than do others. The actions of these committees affect everyone in the party, 
and, collectively, the party and its leaders have a greater interest in mitigating 
the  agency problems that  arise vis-h-vis these committees. Other standing 
committees,  such as Post Office and Civil Service, Interior, and Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, have jurisdiction over issues unrelated, or only mini- 
mally related, to the issues that voters identify with the party. 
Delegation, in this case from the majority party caucus to the standing com- 
mittees of  Congress, in the conventional view of  committees has been mis- 
taken  for abdication (Kiewiet and  McCubbins  1991; Cox and  McCubbins 
1991). The transfer of authority has been recognized, the actions of the agents 
(i.e., committees) witnessed. What have not been appreciated, however, are 
the mechanisms used by  the majority party to direct the actions and choices 
of  their committees and the effect these mechanisms have on committee ac- 
tions. 
If committees are agents of party caucuses then we expect that most of the 
decisions in Congress would be made in committee-that  is, after all, their 
function-and  that committee members would acquire expertise in the com- 
mittee’s jurisdiction-that  is after all why they were delegated the jurisdiction 
in the first place. We  do not expect these functions to be uncontrolled, how- 
ever, and we witness many and varied attempts by  majority party caucuses 
and their leadership to control committees. Further, having  anticipated the 
reaction of the majority party to its proposals, the committee can expect that 
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3.2.2  The Role of the House Appropriations Committee 
In Richard Fenno’s (1966) classic account, the House Appropriations Com- 
mittee was depicted as a budget-slashing “guardian of the federal Treasury” 
(353), protecting the House from the budgetary excesses of its own commit- 
tees and from budget-maximizing bureaucrats. Fenno reported that the House 
Appropriations Committee cut the amount requested by the president in 73.6 
percent of the 575 cases in his data set (Fenno 1966, 353, table 8.1). For a set 
of 69 agencies and programs, including almost all of Fenno’s 36 bureaus, for 
a period extending from  1948 to  1985, I found that the committee cut the 
president’s requests for 70.4 percent of 1,983 cases.I2 
But,  do these statistics constitute evidence that  the “dominant pattern” 
(Fenno 1966, 353) for the House Appropriations Committee is to guard the 
Treasury? If  the procedural restrictions on the Budget Bureau constrain the 
bureau’s ability to revise agency budget estimates, and agencies compile esti- 
mates in accordance with authorizing legislation, then presidential requests 
will reflect, to a large extent, the level of funding preferred by the authorizing 
committees in Congress.  l3 If many committees prefer more spending on items 
within their jurisdiction than  preferred  by  the  House majority party  as a 
whole, and if the House Appropriations  Committee is relatively representative 
of  the  majority  party,14 then  House Appropriations will  often  appear  to 
“guard” the Treasury. 
In Fenno’s account of the House Appropriations Committee, party politics 
plays essentially no role. I have argued here and elsewhere (Cox and  Mc- 
Cubbins 1991; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991) that the committee functions as 
an agent of the majority party, pursuing the collective policy goals of the ma- 
jority party’s membership. These goals may sometimes be to cut the budget, 
but they are not necessarily so. Consequently, the varying goals of the parties 
controlling the White House and the House of Representatives determine, for 
example, the treatment afforded the president’s budget requests by the House 
Committee on Appropriations, with Democratic majorities favoring higher 
spending on domestic programs than Republican majorities. How often the 
committee cuts the president’s requests varies with partisan factors. 
The House committee is most likely to cut the president’s requests when 
the president is a Democrat and the House is controlled by the Republicans 
(cuts amount to 93 percent of actions taken). The committee is somewhat less 
likely to cut the executive’s requests when the same party controls both bod- 
ies-whether  controlled by the Democrats or the Republicans, the committee 
cuts nearly 80 percent of the requests in my  sample; but, a Democratic com- 
mittee is far less likely to cut a Republican president’s requests: only 57 per- 
cent of requests were cut by the committee under these circumstances. Under 
Reagan, the committee cut only 38 percent of the president’s requests, and 
actually proposed increases for 55 percent of the items. Fenno described such 
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omy mood” to a “spending mood.” My  data suggests that the mood toward 
executive budget requests by  the House Appropriations Committee is deter- 
mined by partisan differences between the House, Senate, and the executive. 
Further, if the guardianship hypothesis is correct, I would never expect the 
House, in  its amendments, to decrease the committee’s recommendations. 
The committee, after all, is supposedly doing a job the House is incapable of 
doing, holding back spending. However, I found that more than 58 percent of 
individual, floor changes were decreases, and only 42 percent were increases. 
Of the appropriations  bills amended by the House that I examined, 106, or 43 
percent, reduced the totals recommended by the House Appropriations Com- 
mittee. 
Has the 1974 Budget Act changed the Appropriations Committee from the 
Treasury guardian it once was? There is no evidence that it was a guardian or 
that its function has in fact changed. It has been, and still is, a check used by 
the majority-party leadership to ensure that the policies pursued by the other 
standing committees in the House reflect the collective goals of the member- 
ship of the majority party (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, chap. 3). 
3.2.3  The Congressional Budget Process in the 1980s 
The budget process created by  the  1974 act has three key components. 
First, it created budget committees responsible for setting guidelines for all 
aspects of federal spending and revenue. Second, it requires authorizing com- 
mittees to “reconcile” spending policy within their respective jurisdictions 
with the guidelines. Third, if a committee fails to recommend legislation pro- 
viding satisfactory reconciliation, then the budget committees can write the 
reconciliation legislation for them. 
To ensure that the budget committees are responsible to the majority-party 
caucus and its leadership, the act also established a special relationship be- 
tween the committee and the party leadership. Members are handpicked by 
the leadership, and tenure and seniority norms observed for other committees 
do not  apply. The majority-party leadership, by  these procedures, has rela- 
tively greater control, year in and year out, over the composition of the budget 
committee than it does over the composition of any other committee, allowing 
the majority party leadership to use the budget process to inject the majority 
party’s priorities into the decisions of all committees. 
Indeed, from the perspective of  floor majorities in the House and Senate, 
the budget process has been strikingly effective in the  1980s. In  1981 the 
Republicans in the House and Senate, together with some conservative Dem- 
ocrats used the budget and reconciliation process to “cut” some $36.6 billion 
in spending for fiscal year 1982.15  The first budget resolution called for the 
House Committee on Agriculture to write legislation bringing about “cuts” of 
$2.2 billion in fiscal year 1982 budget authority; required the House Commit- 
tee on Banking and Urban Affairs to “cut” budget authority in its programs by 
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Committee on Energy and Commerce, $6.4 billion; and the Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation, $6.6 billion. In this case a majority consist- 
ing of Republicans and conservative Democrats in the House rolled the House 
Democratic leadership in the budget process. This coalition’s use of the pro- 
cess demonstrated how effective the process could be at submitting congres- 
sional committees to the will of floor majorities. It would also mark the only 
time the House Democratic leadership was rolled. 
The first budget resolution in 1982, for fiscal year 1983, required “cuts” of 
$2.2 billion in budget authority. This time, the House Democratic party, using 
inventive procedures, such as the “King of the Mountain” rule,16 managed to 
reestablish some control over the course of the budget process. The resolution 
required the revenue committees to recommend legislation to raise $20.9 bil- 
lion in additional funds. The budget resolution also required “savings” of $7.8 
billion in defense spending. 
The House Democrats used the budget process in  1983 to draft their own 
budget blueprint as an alternative to the Republican budget submitted by Rea- 
gan. The Democrats’ budget added $33 billion in domestic spending to Rea- 
gan’s proposal, requested $30 billion in new  revenues, and “cut” Reagan’s 
defense request by $16 billion. 
The Republicans in the Senate and the Democrats in the House chose alter- 
native strategies in using the budget process to further their programs. The 
Republican leadership used the budget process to give direction to Senate 
committees. The Democrats used the budget process as a means to unite the 
party behind a common program, with the House Budget Committee holding 
hearings with the entire Democratic caucus. 
Ultimately, the result of  these efforts on the part of party caucuses to control 
the product and actions of committees is that spending policy reflects the de- 
sires of the majority party in each chamber. Indeed, the single best predictor 
of changes in spending policy for almost the whole range of federal programs 
and agencies is party control of Congress and the White House (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991, chap. 8). This analysis suggests that policy is influenced, 
to a far greater extent than commonly believed, by party politics. 
3.3  The Partisan Roots of Deficits 
Having rejected the two most common explanations of the runaway deficits 
of the 1980s, how can they otherwise be explained? To explain deficits, I first 
need to explain federal spending and revenue policies, and how they are af- 
fected by divided government. 
With regard to federal spending decisions, it can be shown that these, at 
every stage of the spending process, reflect party politics.L7  Domestic agen- 
cies, for example, do better under Democratic administrations and Demo- 
cratic Congresses than under Republicans. Defense and high-technology pro- 
grams do better under Republican administrations  and Republican Congresses 
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When the president is a Republican and both houses of Congress are con- 
trolled by Democrats, spending on domestic and social programs is somewhat 
restrained, but is close to the levels that would have been adopted had the 
Democrats controlled the White House as well. In such instances, though the 
Republican presidents act as a restraint on domestic spending, the ability of 
Congress to package various spending items into an omnibus bill makes it 
difficult  for even the most ardent Republicans to limit spending. 
But, what happens when control of  Congress is divided, when a Demo- 
cratic majority controls the House and a Republican majority controls the Sen- 
ate?’* This has happened several times, mostly in the waning decades of the 
nineteenth century, though in this century it has occurred twice, once during 
the second half of Hoover’s administration and most recently between 1981 
and 1986. 
The Constitution established a bilateral veto game between the two cham- 
bers, and each chamber holding a check on the actions of the other. The co- 
operation and coordination necessary to overcome these constitutional  checks 
and balances is frequently inadequate. Budget deficits present members of 
Congress with a collective dilemma: everyone would be better off  if  deficits 
could be reduced, but, individually, members are not willing to reduce spend- 
ing on their preferred programs or to raise taxes for their constituents. Party 
discipline  is  often  required  to  solve  such  collective dilemmas.  Neither 
congressional party is likely to go along with a solution to a problem such as 
the deficit for which the other party can claim credit, and each will use its 
institutional position to defeat the other party’s attempts to solve the problem. 
What is implied by divided control, then, is that the cooperation to solve col- 
lective problems, like the deficit, will largely be nonexistent. 
What then will be the equilibrium to this bilateral veto game? In an effort to 
model this game I make a simplifying assumption about the preferences of the 
members of each party. I assume that there are two types of programs: domes- 
tic programs favored by the Democrats and defense programs favored by the 
Republicans. The preferences of the two parties over budgetary allocations to 
these two goods is given in table 3.2. The Democrats, I assume, prefer most 
that spending on their programs be increased, while spending on the Republi- 
cans’ programs be decreased (denoted D, r in the table). Democrats next most 
prefer that spending on all programs be increased (denoted D, R). Democrats 
are then assumed to prefer decreases in both their own programs and the Re- 
publicans’ programs (denoted d, r) to a decrease in their programs with an 
increase in the Republicans’ programs (d, R). I assume that Republican pref- 
erences are similar with respect to their own programs. 
In  bilateral veto games, the reversionary outcome (i.e., if  no solution is 
adopted) determines what if any cooperative solution will be an equilibrium. 
The spending reversion point for most federal programs is zero. Congress 
must annually enact legislation appropriating money for most of these activi- 
ties if they are to continue. Typically, however, Congress will pass a continu- 
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Table 3.2  Party Ranking of Spending Allocations 
Democrats  Republicans 
Note: D denotes increased spending on Democratic programs; R denotes increased spending on 
Republican  programs; d denotes decreased spending on  Democratic programs; and  r denotes 
decreased spending on Republican programs. 
spending rate for the previous fiscal year) if no appropriations bill is enacted. 
Continuing resolutions typically yield little or no growth in spending and may 
even entail a modest decrease (adjusting for inflation) in spending for the pro- 
grams covered by the resolution. Thus, the reversion, if no spending policy is 
agreed to by  the two parties, is to decrease appropriations for all programs 
(i.e., the outcome denoted d, r in the table is the reversion point). 
The only alternative in the table, then, that is preferred by both parties to 
the reversionary outcome and thus will not be vetoed by one or the other party, 
is the outcome in which spending for the programs of both parties is allowed 
to increase (denoted D, R). Thus, under conditions of divided control, I ex- 
pect overall spending to increase. 
In 1983, for fiscal year 1984, for example, reconciliation legislation did not 
“cut” budget authority in any area. In 1985, for fiscal year 1986, reconcilia- 
tion legislation passed by Congress and signed by  the president, though re- 
quiring “cuts” in agriculture, defense, energy, Medicare, and  10 other pro- 
grams,  increased  spending for  the  EPA’s  Superfund, income  and  social 
security programs, veterans’ affairs, and three other programs. The following 
year, there again were no significant “cuts” in any area. 
Throughout the decade, the Democrats in the House and the Republicans in 
the Senate forged a union that enacted policies confrury to the basic tenets of 
Reagan’s budget policy. In his second term this “coalition” enacted increases 
in social and education programs and “cuts” in defense spending, despite Rea- 
gan’s strenuous opposition. 
I have already noted that spending increased during Reagan’s two terms in 
office-nearly  doubling in current-dollar terms during these eight years. The 
Democratic-Republican spending compromise can be seen in an examination 
of the budget. Though some areas of domestic spending were reduced, largely 
those that were under pressure in earlier decades, other areas increased tre- 
mendously. Defense spending also increased during Reagan’s first term. As 
expected, this spending compromise was abrogated once the Democrats re- 
gained control of  the Senate. With unified  party control of  Congress, the 
Democrats could undertake to cut back on those programs favored by the Re- 
publicans, namely defense. 
With regard to federal revenues, the story is much simpler. The logic of the 101  U.S.  Budget Deficits 
revenue game is presented in figure 3.2. The figure presents the ideal points 
of  congressional Democrats (denoted D in the figure), Southern Democrats 
(SD), and Republicans (R), in an abstract policy space whose dimensions are 
the incidence of  the tax system (along the horizontal axis) and the tax rate 
(along the vertical axis). The incidence of the tax system can be thought of as 
identifying the  individuals who  will  carry the tax burden (from richer to 
poorer); the tax rate merely runs from zero to 100 percent of income. I assume 
that the loss of  welfare to each player as the policy moves away from that 
player’s ideal point is proportional to the distance from the ideal point (that is, 
their indifference contours can be represented as circles). If  this is the case, 
the triangle defined by  the line segments connecting the three ideal points 
contains all the Pareto-optimal outcomes-that  is, the policy choices that can- 
not be changed without making one of the three members worse off. 
Before the victory by Reagan and the Senate Republicans in 198 1,  I assume 
tax policy was set by the Democrats and was at D, their ideal point. Had the 
Senate remained under Democratic control, or had the Democrats maintained 
a large enough majority in the House, no change in  tax policy would have 
been expected, as the Democrats would have had the institutional means to 
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veto any changes in the status quo (which was D). But, after the 1980 elec- 
tion, the Republicans were able to strike a deal to change the tax system with 
conservative, mostly Southern, Democrats in the House. The new tax policy 
was then chosen somewhere between SD and R in figure 3.2, at a point such 
as TA. This point was a new equilibrium: once Reagan proposed the tax cut, 
and the Senate Republicans endorsed it, the Democrats felt they could not 
oppose it. Once the tax reduction was enacted, however, tax increases could 
not be passed, even in the face of mounting budget deficits. Reagan promised 
to veto any tax increase, and with a large Republican minority in the House 
and Republican control of  the Senate,  such vetoes were certain to be  sus- 
tained. The 1981 tax cut reduced current revenues for each succeeding year 
by over $100 billion. 
It was not until the 99th Congress that a new deal, this time between the 
Democrats, who controlled the House, and the Republicans, who controlled 
the Senate and White House, could be struck. This new tax policy, denoted 
TR in the figure, is not much different than the previous tax policy, TA. The 
reforms of  1986, however, were preferred by both the Democrats and the Re- 
publicans to the  1981 tax policy.  Tax  policies that would raise revenue, as 
proposed by the Democrats, require that one or the other of the parties (pre- 
sumably the Republicans) be made worse off. Since each party controls a veto 
in this game, by virtue of their holding one or the other branch of government, 
no increase in revenue was possible. Divided party control within a setting of 
a bilateral veto game as established by the Constitution, then, led to a form of 
stalemate in which the deficit problem was allowed to fester. 
Spending continued to climb at the same constant rate throughout Reagan’s 
administration. Revenues were climbing at almost exactly the same rate as 
expenditures prior to 1982, with a relatively small difference between the two 
trends. As a result of the 1981 tax cut, revenue declined for three years from 
1982 to 1984. After 1984, revenues again paralleled expenditures, but with a 
dramatic increase in the deficit. 
Taken together, the effect of divided government on revenue and spending 
decisions, and the effect of the tax cut of 1981, produced the runaway deficits 
of the 1980s. The pattern is not new, it has recurred throughout the twentieth 
century: since 1929, divided government has yielded sizable increases in the 
national debt. Indeed, the increase in the debt attributable to divided govern- 
ment exceeds the effects of national unemployment and inflation by an order 
of magnitude (these results are reported in the appendix below). If the Demo- 
crats continue to hold majorities in the House and Senate, and the Republicans 
continue to occupy the White House, then little progress will be made toward 
reducing the national debt. 
3.4  Conclusion 
Drawing from the literature on American national government, two expla- 
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ment. The first is that the president did it-that  Ronald Reagan, on his way to 
forging a revolution in American politics, put into place policies that pushed 
America over the deficit precipice. The second has its roots in Congress-that 
the Budget Act of  1974 led to the unraveling of fiscal restraints in Congress. 
Both of these explanations have, at their core, a perception that congressional 
parties are merely shells within which policy is bartered and to which no con- 
trol over policy is granted. Congressional majorities, in these models, have 
abdicated their collective responsibilities over national policy on the one hand 
to the president and, on the other, to congressional committees and subcom- 
mittees. 
The deficits of the 1980s are the consequence of a structural problem: di- 
vided government. Once the deficits of  the  1980s were in full bloom, the 
check Ronald Reagan held over increases in revenue was sufficient to prevent 
Congress from enacting a tax increase. The compromise  required to overcome 
the mutual checks held by the House Democrats and the Senate Republicans 
over each other’s spending programs led to increased spending on nearly every 
function of  government. Though spending has been held in check since the 
Democrats took control of both houses of Congress in 1986, especially spend- 
ing for Republican programs such as defense, Republican threats to veto tax 
increases will keep budget deficits in the headlines for some time to come. 
Appendix 
The central thesis of my paper is that parties exert substantial control over the 
policy-making apparatus in Congress. It follows that divided government will 
lead to increased budget deficits. In this appendix, I examine the effects of 
party politics on the level of the deficit for the period from 1929 to 1988. 
On Measuring Changes in Spending and Deficits 
Before describing my test and results, however, it is important to discuss 
some measurement issues. The first has to do with choosing baselines in com- 
paring fiscal policy from one year to the next. For example, is it possible to 
compare the defense budget in the 1950s to the defense budget in the 1980s? 
There are many pitfalls. Several data transformations are commonly used to 
facilitate this comparison. Budget figures are deflated to account for price 
increases; budgets are described as a percent of  total spending or of  GNP. 
Each transformation serves a purpose, and each introduces errors, distortions, 
and biases into the comparison. Using data transformation willy-nilly espe- 
cially in making comparisons across many years, can introduce more confu- 
sion than clarity. 
On a more abstract level, without explicating a specific theory of the de- 
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properties of  demand functions as an approximation and apply the Slutsky 
equation. The Slutsky equation states that changes in the demand for a com- 
modity can be decomposed into a substitution, or price, effect and an income 
effect. Thus, in modeling fiscal policy decisions, most analysts have included 
GNP  as an explanatory variable (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Barro 1979). 
Dividing your dependent variable-whether  it be federal spending or defi- 
cit-by  an independent variable is highly problematic. To  avoid these prob- 
lems, in the text I compare spending figures over time for federal programs in 
constant dollars. 
The second measurement issue has to do with how to measure the deficit. It 
may seem odd that this is problematic. The deficit, it seems, should just be 
the difference between how  much the government spends and how  much it 
takes in. Something akin to this is the measure commonly reported by  the 
government as the deficit. 
But, this measure of the deficit minimizes the apparent size of the deficit. 
The current surplus in the Social Security trust fund is used to offset the deficit 
in spending on other items. This measure, however, ignores the obligations 
created by the Social Security system. The surplus in the Social Security trust 
fund is not treated as tax revenue for general obligations; the Social Security 
Administration purchases Treasury bonds with the surplus. These bonds must 
be repaid if the Social Security system is to remain solvent. Thus, while the 
deficit measure commonly used by  the federal government treats Social Se- 
curity contributions as general revenue, in actuality the surplus in contribu- 
tions just adds to the debt, which in  this case the government owes to the 
Social Security trust fund. 
Another measure, which treats the bonds held by the Social Security trust 
fund-and  other federal agencies-as  debt instead of revenue, is to examine 
changes in the national debt from one year to the next. This measure captures 
all government borrowing from private and public sources and gives a mea- 
sure of how far government expenditures exceed general revenue. I examine 
both measures here. 
There are still yet  more complications, however.  Analysts, members of 
Congress, and the administration often seek to subtract various components 
of federal spending from deficit measures. These, of course, all have the char- 
acteristic that they make the deficit smaller. Indeed, as is true at many savings 
and loans, the book juggling often yields black ink instead of red. 
As long as people are clear about what they are doing and why, book jug- 
gling is not necessarily a problem. Subtracting interest payments, or some 
fraction thereof, from the deficit might be the right measure to test some hy- 
pothesis in which you are unconcerned about wealth transfers between indi- 
viduals in society. The hypotheses examined here are about policy decisions, 
made by political actors in the federal government. In choosing how to mea- 
sure and report deficit figures in, for example, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, in- 
terest payments were included. In fact no measure of  spending is excluded 
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On the Determinants of the Deficit 
In the 1980s, the annual increments to the national debt (i.e., the budget 
deficit) became larger than the entire budget of just a few years earlier. To  test 
my  hypothesis that divided government leads to increased budgetary imbal- 
ances, I estimate a model of the choice of the deficit, derived from models of 
spending and revenue developed elsewhere (Kiewiet and McCubbins 199 1; 
McCubbins 1990). The estimation involves income effects (modeled as GNP 
and unemployment) and substitution effects (various political variables, in- 
cluding dummy variables corresponding to periods of  divided government, 
wars and inflation). The model is represented by  the independent variables 
listed in table 3.A1. 
The estimation in table 3.A1 was affected  by a few econometric problems, 
the most serious of which was autocorrelation. In each case I included a set of 
lagged dependent and independent variables to correct for potential inefficien- 
cies. Other details of the estimation can be found in McCubbins (1990). 
In table 3.A1, I estimate a model of deficit determination using three differ- 
ent measures of the deficit. In column 1, I estimate the model using the com- 
mon definition of the deficit that is reported each year by the federal govern- 
ment (measured in constant collars). This measure is simply the difference 
Table 3.A1  On The Determination of the Federal Budget Deficit, 1929-88 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable 
DEFICIT  ADEBT  DEBT/GNP 




PRES DEMkONGRESS  REP 
PRES REPkONGRESS DEM 






POSTWAR  AGNP 
DEFICIT,_, 
DEFICIT,- 




Sum  of Squared residuals 
28.69 
-84.39* 
-  9.40* 
2.81 






-  .06 
.45* 
.02 








-  .09 



















~  ~~ 
Note: For definition of variables, see appendix text. Values in table are estimated coefficients. 
The  coefficient is significant with probability greater than or equal to  .95. 106  Mathew D. McCubbins 
each year between federal expenditures and federal revenue from all sources 
(including, e.g., Social Security). In column 2, I estimated the model using 
as a measure of the deficit the percentage change from one year to the next in 
the size of the (constant-dollar) federal debt. This measure has the advantage 
that it includes purchases of Treasury notes by Social Security (which in fact 
must be repaid by future taxes) as part of the debt, and, therefore, as part of 
the deficit. In column 3, at the request of the editors, I measure the deficit as 
the percent of GNP accounted for by  the debt (both in current dollars). This 
latter measure, of course, necessitated the elimination of GNP as an indepen- 
dent variable. 
The variables in table 3.A1 are defined as follows: DEFICIT is the constant- 
dollar federal budget deficit, calculated from the current-dollar figures re- 
ported in Historical Statistics of the United States (U.S.  Department of Com- 
merce, Census Bureau 1975) and summary tables in The Budget of the United 
States Government (U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget, various years), and the Implicit Price Deflator for federal 
government purchases of goods and services as reported in Survey of Current 
Business (U.S.  Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, var- 
ious years); ADEBT  is the percentage change in the (1972) constant-dollar fed- 
eral debt,Ig  using the Implicit Price Deflator for federal government purchases 
of goods and services to deflate the current debt figures, as reported in Histor- 
ical Statistics (U. S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau 1975), Histor- 
ical Tables, Budget of  the United States Government (U.S. Executive Office 
of  the President, Office of  Management and Budget, 1989) for fiscal 1990, 
and the Economic Report of the President (U.S. Council of Economic Advis- 
ers, 1989);  DEBT/GNP is the ratio of current debt to current GNP for each year, 
drawn from Historical  Statistics, Historical  Tables, Budget  of  the  United 
States Government for fiscal 1990, and the Economic Report of the President; 
WII  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the fiscal years of World 
War 11,  1943-45,  and zero otherwise; KOREA is a dummy variable that takes 
on a value of one for the fiscal years 1952 and 1953, and zero otherwise;  PRES 
REP~ONGRESS  DEM is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one when the 
presidency was held by a Republican, and the Congress was controlled by the 
Democrats (fiscal years 1956-61,  1970-77,  and 1988), and zero otherwise; 
PRES DEWCONGRESS  REP  is a dummy variable that takes on  a value of  one 
when the president is a Democrat and the Congress is controlled by  the Re- 
publicans (1948-49),  and zero otherwise;  PRES REP~ONGRESS  DIV is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one when the president is a Republican and 
control of the two houses of Congress is divided (fiscal years 1932-33  and 
1982-87);  U  is the unemployment rate during the fiscal year, as reported by 
Survey of Current Business; I  is the rate of  inflation during the fiscal year, 
calculated as a change in the Consumer Price Index, as reported in Historical 
Statistics and Survey of  Current Business; GNP is the (1972) constant-dollar 
GNP as reported by Survey of  Current Business; POSTWAR GNP is a variable 107  U.S. Budget Deficits 
that is equal to GNP for fiscal years after the end of World War I1 (1946-88), 
and is zero otherwise; AGNP is the percentage change in real GNP;*O POST- 
WAR  AGNP is a variable that equals AGNP for 1946-88,  and is zero other- 
wise. 
From previous research on spending decisions, I expected increasing un- 
employment to lead to increased spending. I therefore expect increases in the 
unemployment rate, all else constant, to lead to increased deficits, and thus, 
U  to have a negative coefficient in column 1 (deficits are measure as negative 
numbers, surpluses as positive numbers) and positive coefficients in columns 
2 and 3. I have no prediction about how changes in I will affect budget defi- 
cits. Wars  increase defense and related spending and seem to have a mixed 
effect, but no net decrease, on domestic spending. I thus expect the wartime 
variables (WII  and KOREA), all else constant, to yield negative coefficients in 
column 1 and positive coefficients in columns 2 and 3.21  If  spending has in- 
creased faster than revenue as the economy has grown, then the coefficients 
for the two GNP measures will be negative in column 1 and positive in the 
other two columns. My model of party politics implies that deficits will not 
increase (Republican majorities might decrease spending and therewith the 
deficit) when both houses of Congress are controlled by the same party (the 
majority party in Congress will control the agenda over spending and taxes), 
even when the president is of  a different party, all else constant. Thus, PRES 
DEM~ONGRESS  REP  and  PRES  REP~ONGRESS  DEM  should be nonnegative in 
column 1 and nonpositive in the remaining regressions. It is important to note, 
however, that divided control of Congress should yield higher deficits: that is, 
PRES REP~ONGRESS  DIV should be negative in column 1 and positive in col- 
umn 2 and 3. 
The results here strongly support the hypothesis that divided control of 
Congress leads to increased deficits: in all three equations, the coefficient on 
divided control of Congress was significant and in the predicted direction. We 
have had two occurrences of divided congressional control in this century, 
once in the latter half of the Hoover administration and for the first six years 
of the Reagan administration. If  we estimate two dummies, one for each oc- 
currence, both  yield significant coefficients in  an auxiliary regression. Di- 
vided control of government, otherwise, when the effects of divided control 
of Congress and the tax act of  1981 are held constant, shows either no effect 
on  deficits or confirms that  Republican control of  Congress produces de- 
creased spending and therewith decreased deficits. The coefficients for unem- 
ployment and GNP had the predicted sign, but were not always significant. 
The war dummies always had the right sign, and the dummy for World War I1 
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Notes 
1.  The measure of the debt used in fig. 3.1 is the gross federal debt. This “is the 
broadest generally used measure of the Federal debt. It is composed primarily of the 
public debt (direct borrowing by the Treasury) but also includes agency debt (such as 
borrowing  by  the Tennessee Valley Authority  or the Postal Service). About three- 
fourths of the gross debt is held by the public, and about one-fourth is held by Govern- 
ment accounts” (U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau 1975, 1097). This is 
the measure of the debt most commonly applied by Congress, e.g., in defining debt 
ceilings. As the debt and deficit have become important political issues, many new and 
creative measures of each have been prescribed. I address some of the measurement 
issues involved in measuring the debt and the deficit in the appendix. 
2.  The  1921 act redelegated the responsibility to compile budget estimates to the 
president from the Treasury Department, Division of Book Keeping and Warrants. The 
act specified that the new budget conform to existing law on agency reporting, which 
included such minutiae as estimates from the Navy Department for printing and sta- 
tionary; advertising; postage; fuel oil and candles for navy yards; funeral expenses, 
etc. (see Kiewiet and McCubbins 1989; see also U.S. Congress, House 1921). 
3.  Sundquist (1981, 12) describes the difference between delegation and abdication 
as merely semantic, saying that any delegation by Congress is abdication. 
4.  In granting authority to the president under the 1921 act, Congress required that 
the estimates submitted conform to existing law. The earlier legislation, e.g., required 
that estimates be made only for those items authorized by law and that large deviations 
in estimates from the previous year’s appropriations must be explained in detail (for 
details on the requirements of the 1921 act, see U.S. Congress, House 1921). 
5.  Why members of Congress have delegated the authority to propose legislation to 
the president is explored in Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988). They argue that Congress 
will always delegate to someone the jobs of fact-finding and the drafting of legislation. 
The choice  is between  an executive  agency or  department,  which will be  heavily 
influenced  by  congressional  committees  or the  president,  who  is  independent  of 
such “iron triangles.” When the members want to establish a check on their own com- 
mittees, they  must  secure information  from  sources independent of those commit- 
tees.  Only  one  official in  the  federal  government  satisfies the  requirements-the 
president. 
6.  Continuing resolutions are joint resolutions that may provide temporary funding 
for affected agencies when Congress fails to complete action on one or more regular 
appropriations bills before the start of a fiscal year (see Oleszek 1989). 
7. Reagan, in each of his budget requests, sought to terminate several dozen pro- 
grams, ranging from the Jobs Corps, to Amtrak, to the Small Business Administration, 
to urban mass transit subsidies and rural water and waste disposal grants. Congress 
voted only to terminate the U.S. Travel and Tourism Agency and to sell Conrail. In- 
deed, of those programs the president tried to kill in, e.g.,  1985, only half even had 
their budgets reduced. 
8.  Based on an analysis  of  a sample of 63 domestic programs.  Elsewhere (Mc- 
Cubbins 1990, table A-2),  I present results that compare the effects of  all postwar 
presidents on budget requests.  The regression reported there shows that Reagan, on 
average, all else constant, requested far deeper spending cuts than any postwar presi- 
dent. Further, Republicans requested greater cuts in spending, all else equal, than did 
Democrats, with the exception of Carter. See section 3.2.2 below. 
9.  Restraint in spending growth contrasts with the budget “cuts” most often referred 
to in Reagan’s fiscal 1982 budget, which were changes in authorizations relative to 
policies set under Carter (see Muris 1989). 109  U.S. Budget Deficits 
10.  These expectations reflect projections of the success of a Republican president 
facing a Democratic majority in the House and a Republican majority in the Senate. 
11. For some critical tests, see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and Cox and Mc- 
Cubbins (1989). 
12.  The obverse, of course, is that the committee increased spending for over 19 
percent of the budget items that came before it, and they granted an amount equal to 
the president’s request in almost  10 percent of the cases. The proportion of times the 
committee recommended an increase for one of these items over the president’s request 
ranged from zero percent in fiscal year  1947 to over 13 percent in fiscal years 1959- 
61, to a high of 51 percent in 1984. 
13. This, of course, is implicitly Mayhew’s (1974) model of agency estimates.  If 
we are to believe that the committee is protecting members from themselves, the esti- 
mates the committee deals with must be a reflection of their own desires. If they were 
not, then the committee would be protecting members from the executive branch, not 
from themselves. 
14.  On  the  unrepresentativeness  of  many House  committees  see  Cox  and  Mc- 
Cubbins (1991). On the representativeness of the House Appropriations Committee, 
see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991). 
15.  “Cuts” referred to changes in authorization so that spending was less than it 
would have been under existing law.  For example, “cuts” in Medicare were said to 
exceed $50 billion for the  1980s. Yet current dollar Medicare outlays actually grew 
from $32 billion to $94 billion between  1983 and 1988 (Muris 1989). Growth in real 
terms was only 45 percent. 
16.  Under this rule, adopted by the House in May 1982, seven budget alternatives 
were considered (and 68 perfecting amendments), with the House Budget Committee’s 
recommendation being voted last. The rule requires that the last alternative to win a 
majority is the plan that prevails. This is just one example of the extraordinary rule 
changes used by the Democrats to control the budget process and the conservative Boll 
Weevil faction. In  1982 none of the alternatives won a majority. It was used again in 
1983, when the Democratic House Budget Committee’s plan prevailed. 
17.  See, generally, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991). McCubbins (1990, tables A-2, 
A-3) also presents results that model partisan differences in presidential spending re- 
quests and congressional appropriations decisions. 
18.  Alesina  and Tabellini  (1989)  and  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989)  discuss  cross- 
nationally the impact of party policy and divided government on budget deficits. 
19. I use an approximation for the percentage change that is calculated as ADEBT = 
log(DEBT/DEBT,-,)  where DEBT, is the federal debt measured in constant dollars in year 
t. This transformation is referred to as a partial log. 
20.  I again use a partial log transformation. 
21.  A dummy variable for the Vietnam war was dropped from the specification, all 
tests showed that its effect was insignificant. 
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Comment  Robert J. B~O 
Over the  last few years, many  costs have been assigned to  federal  budget 
deficits. Until now, I have argued that these costs were small. I see now that 
Robert J. Barro is professor of economics at Harvard University and research associate of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 112  Mathew D. McCubbins 
there are also offsetting benefits; after all, if  Reagan had not run his deficits I 
would not have experienced the joy of discussing this paper. 
One thesis in McCubbins’s paper is that Reagan’s record in holding down 
federal expenditure was  unimpressive in  comparison with  his presidential 
predecessors. The data presented to support this proposition are hard to under- 
stand because of the random switching between real and nominal magnitudes 
(“current-dollar spending nearly doubled from fiscal year 1981 to 1989”) and 
the failure to make historical comparisons on a consistent basis. (“Constant- 
dollar spending grew at a faster rate during Reagan’s administration [25 per- 
cent from  1981 to  19881 than during the Eisenhower [16 percent growth], 
Nixon [  13 percent], Ford [three percent], and Carter [  12 percent] administra- 
tions .” Even after noticing that the figures represent accumulations over ad- 
ministrations  of different length, I could not reproduce some of these figures.) 
Table 3.C1 shows the annual average growth rates of real federal expendi- 
tures during the presidential administrations beginning with Eisenhower’s.  I 
use calendar-year figures that correspond as closely as possible to the actual 
dates in office (e.g., 1961-63  for Kennedy and  1969-74  for Nixon). These 
numbers (col. 1 of the table) show that Reagan’s growth rate, 3.1%, exceeded 
the growth rates for Eisenhower (1  .O%)  and Nixon (2.6%), but were below 
those of the other presidents, including Carter (3.5%) and Ford (4.9%). 
The figures based on total federal spending are somewhat misleading be- 
cause they credit Eisenhower and Nixon with the cutbacks in defense spend- 
ing associated with the terminations of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, re- 
spectively. For  nondefense expenditures (col . 2  of  table  3.  C 1  ) , Reagan’s 
growth rate of 2.6% was below that of the others. The growth rate for Eisen- 
hower and Nixon  are now  5.8% and  6.7%, respectively, and  the second- 
lowest growth rate is 3.7% for Carter. My inference from these figures is that 
a substantial slowing of the growth rate of real nondefense federal spending 
has occurred, although this slowing began during the Carter administration. 
Two  types of  adjustment for inflation arise in analyses of  budget deficits 
and  public debt. The first is the division of  nominal magnitudes by  a price 
index or by nominal income or product. As  mentioned before, this type of 
adjustment occurs only occasionally in McCubbins’s paper. The second ad- 
justment involves the inflation rate, rather than the price level, and concerns 
the distinction between nominal and real interest rates. The natural definition 
of the government’s real budget deficit is the change over time in the govern- 
ment’s net real obligations. If the government holds no assets and if its liabil- 
ities are all in  the form of nominal bonds, then the real deficit equals the 
change in the real public debt: 
1. Real federal spending is the ratio of nominal spending to the GNP  deflator. The results are 
similar with the deflator for federal purchases. The federal purchases deflator is problematic, 
however, because it is based mainly on cost measures, especially wage rates. This deflator is also 
inappropriate  for transfer payments. 113  U.S. Budget Deficits 
Table 3.C1  Growth of Real Federal Spending during Presidential 
Administrations 
Growth Rate of 
Real Federal Spending 
Growth Rate of Real, 
Nondefense Federal Spending 

























Note:  Real federal spending is the ratio of nominal spending (as defined in the national accounts) 
to the GNP deflator. The figures shown are average annual growth rates from the calendar year 
preceding each president’s first term to his final year in office. 
(1)  d(BIP)/dt = (1/P)  *  (dB/dt) -  IT*(B/P), 
where B is the nominal quantity of  government bonds, P is the price level, 
and IT  = (UP) (dP/dt) is the inflation rate. The first term on the right side of 
equation (1) is the conventionally defined nominal deficit, dB/dt, divided by 
the price level. The second term, IT.(B/P),  is the adjustment of the deficit to 
account for the erosion of the real value of the nominal debt due to inflation. 
The real budget deficit can also be expressed as the difference between real 
spending and real revenue. The result corresponds to equation (1) if the term 
IT.(B/P)  is subtracted from the real value of the government’s nominal interest 
payments, R.(B/P), where R is the nominal interest rate. That is, real interest 
payments are computed by using the real interest rate, R -  IT,  rather than the 
nominal rate, R. From an ex ante standpoint, the adjustment involves the ex- 
pected inflation rate, IT=,  rather than the actual rate, IT.  That is, if   IT^ appears 
instead of IT in equation (l),  then the relation determines the change in the 
real debt that would occur in the absence of unanticipated inflation. 
The adjustment of budget deficits for inflation is quantitatively important. 
For example, using numbers that correspond roughly to the present situation, 
if the expected inflation rate is 5% per year and the stock of debt is $2 trillion, 
then the adjustment, IT~*B,  reduces the deficit by $100 billion. 
In the empirical work (table 3.A1), McCubbins uses the growth rate of  the 
real public debt (his variable ADEBT) as one of the dependent variables. This 
concept corresponds to the real deficit as defined in equation (1) (except that 
he does not net out the portion of the debt held by government agencies and 
trust funds or the Federal Reserve). In another specification, he uses the con- 
ventional nominal budget deficit divided by a price index as a dependent vari- 114  Mathew D. McCubbins 
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Fig. 3.C1  Federal spending as a ratio to GNP (CN:  interest payments adjusted 
for expected inflation) 
able (his variable DEFICIT).  This measure does not adjust for inflation; in fact, 
McCubbins criticizes this type of adjustment. Apparently, he does not realize 
that his ADEBT variable makes the (reasonable) adjustment that he is criti- 
cizing. 
Figures 3.C1-3.C8  provide measures of  the history of  U.S.  government 
spending, revenue, budget deficit, and public debt. Figure 3.C1 plots the ratio 
of total federal spending, as customarily defined, to GNP. The dashed line in 
the figure shows the ratio when federal spending is revised downward to elim- 
inate the portion of nominal interest payments that corresponds to expected 
inflation, .rr'*(BIP). I use the Livingston survey of expected future values of 
the consumer price index (provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of  Philadel- 
phia) to compute 7~  e. 
During the Reagan administration, the (adjusted) spending-GNP ratio rises 
from .208 in  1980 to .234 in  1982-83  and then falls to .213 in 1988. The 
increase in the ratio from 1980 to 1982-83 corresponds mainly to increases in 
defense spending (fig. 3.C2) and interest payments (fig. 3.C3), as well as to 
the decline in real GNP because of  the 1982-83  recession. After 1983, de- 
fense spending and adjusted interest payments are roughly constant as ratios 
to GNP; therefore, the decline in the overall spending ratio involves cuts in 
other components of spending in relation to GNP. One thing to notice in figure 
3.C2 is that the trough in the defense ratio occurs in 1978-79.  The rise in the 
ratio starts with Carter, not Reagan. 
Figure 3.C4 plots the ratio of  federal revenue to GNP along with the ad- 115  U.S. Budget Deficits 
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Fig. 3.C4  Federal spending and revenues as ratios to GNP 
justed spending ratio. The gap between these two series equals the ratio of the 
budget deficit (adjusted for expected inflation) to GNP; this ratio is plotted as 
the dashed line in figure 3.C5. (The solid line shows the ratio for the conven- 
tional budget deficit.) The onset of a substantial deficit in 1982 corresponds to 
an increase in the spending ratio and  a decrease in  the revenue ratio. This 
behavior is customary during a recession; for example, figure 3.C4 and 3.C5 
reveal similar patterns for 1958 and 1975. From the perspective of the long- 
term U.S. history, the data for 1982-83 accord with the usual relation between 
budget deficits and economic contraction. 
Starting in  1984, the budget deficit gets out of line with the behavior of the 
economy. The spending ratio does not decline much until after 1986 and the 
revenue ratio rises slower than usual during an economic recovery (because of 
the Reagan tax cuts). The spending and revenue ratios do converge gradually 
over time, and the ratio of the adjusted deficit to GNP falls from a peak of 
4.0% in 1983 to 1.4% in 1988 and 0.9% in 1989. 
Figure 3.C6 shows the ratio of privately held U.S. public debt to GNP. (The 
debt figures are at the end of  the calendar year since 1916 and at midyear 
before 1916.) This measure of the debt nets out the amounts held by federal 
agencies and trust funds and the Federal Reserve. Note that the debt ratio rose 
from 21.5% in 1979 to 38.6% in 1987. Then, with the cutback in the deficit- 
GNP ratio, the debt ratio fell to 38.0% in  1989. In particular, the reduced 
deficits meant that the debt-GNP ratio was no longer rising after 1987. 
Figures 3.C7 and 3.C8 provide information for the total government sector. 
The overall story is similar to that for the federal government. Because of the 117  U.S.  Budget Deficits 
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state and local surplus, however, the ratio of  the adjusted budget deficit to 
GNP for total government peaks at only 2.9% in  1983 and then declines to 
0.6%  in 1989. 
McCubbins  sketches  a  game-theoretic  political  model  of  government 
spending. Republicans like high defense spending and low nondefense spend- 
ing, whereas Democrats have the opposite preferences. (I do not see how this 
fits with Carter’s initiation of the defense buildup or with the Democrats being 
in power when the United States entered the Vietnam War, the Korean War, 
World War 11, and World War I.) McCubbins also assumes that both political 
parties prefer high levels of each category of spending to low levels of each. 
Therefore, in a situation of  divided political power, the equilibrium entails 
high levels of both types of spending. 
One point about the model is that any desired result can be obtained by 
making the appropriate assumptions about preferences. For example, it would 
be easy to generate the conclusion that divided government leads to a low 
level of  government spending, rather than a high level. This observation is 
important because the theoretical “predictions” are tailored (as discussed be- 
low) to fit a single episode, the Reagan budget deficits. A second point is that 
the theory pertains to the size of government, not to budget deficits, per se. 
To generate a theory of budget deficits, McCubbins sketches an analogous 
game-theoretic model of tax revenues. I could not find an intertemporal bud- 
get constraint in this analysis; that is, preferences about expenditures seem to 
be independent of those for taxes, and preferences for taxes seem to be inde- 
pendent of  those for expenditures. If  politicians perceive no intertemporal 
budget constraint, then tax revenues would presumably be set to zero. If they 
take account of the (eventual) link between spending and taxes, then prefer- 
ences about expenditures cannot be  separated from those about taxes. One 
could introduce a political game that concerns the composition of taxation in 
terms of degree of graduation, direct versus indirect taxes, and so on. But that 
analysis need not interact very much with the determination of total tax reve- 
nues, which is the aggregate that matters for the budget deficit. The analysis 
could also consider conflicts between older and younger generations, which 
might matter for budget  deficits (and Social Security). Interesting political 
models of this type include Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) and Tabellini and 
Alesina (1990). As it stands, however, the McCubbins paper does not con- 
sider intergenerational conflicts or other forces that could provide a theory of 
budget deficits. 
In the empirical analysis, McCubbins includes some variables-wartime, 
business-cycle measures,  and inflation-that  do not appear in his political 
analysis but that enter naturally into a familiar theory of budget deficits that 
relies on optimal public  finance. This  approach determines the  timing  of 
taxes, given the size and time pattern of public expenditures and the compo- 
sition of  taxes by type. (These variables could be determined from a model 
that includes political interactions.) Optimal fiscal policy features tax smooth- 120  Mathew D. McCubbins 
ing (Pigou 1928, chap. 6; Barro 1979, 1986). This smoothing implies that 
temporary government expenditures, as in wartime, are financed primarily by 
debt issue to avoid temporarily large increases in tax rates. Similarly, short- 
falls in income during recessions call for debt finance; otherwise, tax rates 
would be temporarily high during economic contractions. The model implies 
also that an increase in the expected-inflation portion of  the government’s 
nominal interest payments, wB,  raises nominal debt issue, dBldt, one to one. 
Equivalently, the conventional deficit can be adjusted for expected inflation as 
described before. 
I showed (Barro 1986)  that the tax-smoothing  model provides a good expla- 
nation for the determination of U.S .  budget deficits from 191  6 to 1983. Three 
variables-temporary  federal spending associated especially with wars, tem- 
porary movements of income and hence tax receipts due to business fluctua- 
tions, and the expected inflation term, nc-B-account  for the main variations 
in the federal deficit. The model also explains the bulk of U.K. budget deficits 
from 1706 to 1918 (Barro 1987). In this case, the major influence is tempo- 
rary government spending during wars. 
In terms of the Reagan administration, the tax-smoothing model fits the 
observed behavior of federal budget deficits through 1983. That is, the reces- 
sion for 1982-83 is large enough to explain the deficits, which were about 5% 
of GNP (or 4% of GNP after the adjustment of interest payments for the effect 
of expected inflation). The deficits recorded from 1984 onward are, however, 
significant outliers. In particular, the variables used in the 1916-83 relations 
and the coefficients estimated from this relation lead to a significant underpre- 
diction of the budget deficits for 1984-88.  The residual from these forecasts 
peak at about 2.5% of GNP in 1986, but falls to about 1.5% of GNP in 1988 
(and about 1% of  GNP in 1989). Given these substantial errors that persist 
over several years, it is reasonable to think about additional factors as deter- 
minants of budget deficits. It is, however, not very promising to advance po- 
litical arguments that would have been operating throughout the 1916-83 pe- 
riod but were unnecessary to explain the behavior of deficits over those years. 
Although McCubbins’s empirical work on budget deficits from  1929 to 
1988 (table 3.A1) includes variables that arise in the tax-smoothing model, 
his specification does not accord with that model. In the theory, temporary 
government spending, as in wartime, has roughly a one-to-one effect on the 
deficit. McCubbins enters dummy variables for World War I1 and the Korean 
WN, but does not attempt to measure the size of temporary federal spending 
either during these wars or at other times. 
In  the  tax-smoothing  theory  (and  in  standard computations of  a  full- 
employment budget deficit), the effect of recession involves the shortfall of 
tax receipts associated with the shortfall of income. McCubbins includes the 
unemployment rate and the level of real GNP in a linear form. The unemploy- 
ment rate and the growth rate of real GNP provide information about the per- 
centage shortfall in real GNP, but the effect on tax receipts involves an inter- 121  U.S. Budget Deficits 
action with the share of tax receipts in GNP. For example, an unemployment 
rate of 25% in  1991 would lead to a much larger deficit as a fraction of GNP 
than it did in 1933 when the share of government in GNP was much smaller. 
By  forcing a linear form over a sample (1929-88)  in which the share of gov- 
ernment changed greatly, McCubbins fails to account satisfactorily for the 
cyclical behavior of the budget deficit. 
McCubbins also does not measure properly the effects of inflation, although 
this problem would be minor in the equation that uses the growth rate of the 
real debt (ADEBT). This specification, however, does not adjust the gross pub- 
lic debt for the amounts held by federal agencies and trust funds or the Federal 
Reserve. Thus, the measured deficit would rise, for example, if  the govern- 
ment cut income taxes and raised Social Security taxes by  an equal amount 
(so that the Social Security trust fund absorbed more of the Treasury’s debt). 
Since the Social Security tax is a form of federal tax and Social Security ben- 
efits are a form of  federal expenditures, it is natural to consolidate Social 
Security with the rest of the government in computations of total federal rev- 
enue, spending, budget deficit, and public debt. 
Recently-that  is, since Social Security began to run  a substantial sur- 
plus-some  people have argued that the federal deficit should be calculated 
independently of Social Security. One reason to think separately about Social 
Security is that, because of demographic trends, the ratio of benefits to GNP 
is projected to grow over time. If  other components of  federal spending are 
expected to maintain a constant ratio to GNP, then the tax-smoothing model 
prescribes a current budget surplus. That is, current tax rates are set to match 
the higher anticipated ratio of  overall federal spending (including Social Se- 
curity benefits) to GNP. Of course, this projection for Social Security may be 
wrong. Future spending depends on changes in benefit formulas, immigration 
may upset the demographic forecasts, and so on. 
The general point, which is not special to Social Security, is that prospects 
for future government spending influence today’s optimal fiscal policy. If the 
ratio to GNP of some component of spending, such as defense, is projected to 
rise or fall over time, and if  the rest of spending is expected to stay constant 
in relation to GNP, then tax-smoothing calls, respectively, for a current budget 
surplus or deficit. For example, if we (or, more pertinently, Ronald Reagan) 
believed in the mid-1980s that future changes in Eastern Europe would gen- 
erate a peace dividend, then the appropriate response would have been to run 
a budget deficit.* This mechanism is one way  to reconcile the “excessive” 
budget deficits of 1984-88  with the tax-smoothing model. If Reagan thought 
that the ratios of federal spending to GNP in the mid  1980s were about two 
percentage points higher than “normal,” then the deficits were not excessive. 
2. I abstract here from possible adverse effects from the  Persian Gulf War.  This event was 
unanticipated at the time of this conference. I assume, perhaps unreasonably, that Reagan also did 
not anticipate this war in the mid-1980s. 122  Mathew D. McCubbins 
McCubbins argues that his political theory is strongly supported by the sig- 
nificantly positive effect on deficits of  his variable, PRES  REPICONGRESS DIV 
(his table 3.A1). This variable is, in fact, a dummy for the fiscal years 1932- 
33 and  1982-87.  In 1932-33,  which is the trough of the Great Depression, 
budget deficits were large (4% of  GNP in 1932 and 6% in 1933). A proper 
treatment of cyclical variables explains these deficits without any reliance on 
political variables (Barro 1986, table 10.4). As mentioned before, the appro- 
priate cyclical variables also fit the budget deficits for 1982-83.  Since Mc- 
Cubbins does not account adequately for cyclical factors, his estimation gives 
too much credit to the dummy variable that takes on the value “1” in 1932-33 
The rest of  the period covered by  the dummy variable is 1984-87; as al- 
ready mentioned, the Reagan budget deficits in this period are larger than the 
historical relation would predict (unless one adjusts the measure of temporary 
federal spending as discussed before for the projected peace dividend). In any 
event, the high budget deficits for 1984-87  add to the explanatory power of 
the dummy variable. But there is no trick to explaining the Reagan deficits by 
invoking a dummy variable for the relevant period. In fact, after the event, 
there are many variables that one could select that happen to be unusually high 
in 1984-87. (Unfortunately, the anticipated peace dividend falls into this cat- 
egory; therefore, I am reluctant to stress this argument.) The serious challenge 
is to find  a force that accords with a complete theory and that also can be 
checked out by more than a single episode. Perhaps after McCubbins com- 
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